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 Although the United States Supreme Court’s disposition of Bush 
v. Gore (Bush II)1 ultimately turned on the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, an alternative theory, based on Arti-
cle II of the United States Constitution, has garnered significant 
academic support in the year following the decision.2 The Article II 
theory was suggested in the initial per curiam opinion (Bush I)3 and 
in the questions of the Justices during the oral arguments, and was 
fully embraced by the concurrence in Bush II, which was written by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
The reliance on Article II entailed a distinctive vision of the role of 
state constitutions in the state governmental process and of the place 
of federal courts in overseeing that role. The concurrence explicitly 
adopted the view that the Constitution provided federal constraints 
                                                                                                                    
 * Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law 
School, 1990. I am grateful to Jim Rossi and the other organizers and participants in this 
symposium. William W. Buzbee, Joseph P. Helm, Michael L. Wells, and Robert F. Williams 
provided valuable advice and assistance. 
 1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, 
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001); Richard A. Epstein, “In such Manner as the 
Legislature Thereof May Direct”: The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 613 (2001). 
 3. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam). 
662  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:661 
 
on the authority of state courts to construe state procedures govern-
ing presidential elections.4 Under this conception, the concurrence 
insisted on a central role for federal courts in policing the relation-
ship between state courts and state legislatures. 
 The concurrence understood Article II both to grant plenary power 
to state legislatures and to mandate federal oversight of a state 
court’s interpretation of state law. Under this theory, the federal 
courts not only review whether state law, as interpreted by state 
courts, violates the Federal Constitution, but also review whether the 
state court correctly interpreted state law. The concurrence justified 
this extraordinary assertion of federal authority based on the need to 
protect the state legislature from the state courts. The concurrence 
further contended that uniformity in the construction of state elec-
tion procedures was desirable and justified federalizing the interpre-
tation of state law. 
 Underlying the concurrence’s interpretation of Article II was a 
conception of the state constitutional system. The concurrence envis-
aged a unitary model of state constitutionalism that involved a 
strong dichotomy between state constitutions and other forms of 
state law. The concurrence apparently conceived of state constitu-
tions and state statutes as relatively autonomous with little inter-
penetration. In the concurrence’s vision, state constitutions and state 
statutes may be divided in a fairly straightforward manner without 
any particular need to examine the context of a specific state’s consti-
tutional system. The concurrence further assumed the predominance 
of uniform principles of the allocation of interpretive authority at the 
state level. At various points, the concurrence also evinced skepti-
cism about the ability of state judges to reach fair and reasonable de-
cisions and a corresponding confidence in the ability of federal courts 
to discern appropriate benchmarks against which to measure state 
judicial deviation. 
 This Article argues that the flawed nature of the concurrence’s 
understanding of state constitutional systems fatally undermined its 
conclusions. The concurrence’s homogenizing conception failed to 
capture important features of state constitutions. An understanding 
of the role of state constitutions in the state law process requires an 
appreciation of the characteristics of a particular state’s constitution. 
The attempt to fit all state constitutions into a particular mold will 
necessarily fail, and the complexity of each state’s constitutional dy-
namic suggests that the United States Supreme Court should not at-
tempt to create uniform rules of interpretation governing the role of 
state constitutions in presidential election disputes. The principle of 
separation of powers in state governments takes a variety of forms 
                                                                                                                    
 4. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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and often differs substantially from the federal model. Without an 
understanding of a particular state’s system, it is impossible to com-
prehend the appropriate relationship between state courts and state 
legislatures. Moreover, the diversity of state statutory regimes belies 
the concurrence’s apparent confidence in the existence of a single, 
correct method of interpreting state statutes and its related assertion 
that it, rather than the Florida Supreme Court, best understood the 
Florida Election Code. 
 Part I reviews the concurrence’s theory that Article II of the Fed-
eral Constitution grants special, plenary authority to the state legis-
lature. I argue that this interpretation did not rest on firm founda-
tions of text, precedent, or history. Rather, the concurrence’s concep-
tion could be justified, if at all, only by resort to unarticulated federal 
interests. Part II analyzes the concurrence’s related, but distinct con-
clusion that Article II mandates that federal courts independently 
review the correctness of state courts’ constructions of state laws 
governing presidential elections. As with the concurrence’s notion of 
plenary legislative power, I argue that the concurrence’s scrutiny of 
state courts’ interpretation of state law can be justified only by the 
existence of extraordinary federal interests, which remain unex-
plored in the opinion. Part III turns directly to an account of the fed-
eral interests at stake. This Part examines potential interests, such 
as the need to protect the state legislature from unprincipled judicial 
activism, the need for uniformity in the interpretation of presidential 
election codes, and the relative competence of the federal courts in 
interpreting state election laws. I argue that a proper understanding 
of state constitutional systems demonstrates the absence of any of 
these potential justifications for federal judicial intervention in this 
case. Part III further contends that the diversity of state constitu-
tional contexts undermines the concurrence’s efforts to formulate 
uniform interpretive rules for state election codes. Part IV concludes 
with some more general reflections on the implications of the concur-
rence’s flawed conception of state constitutional law. 
I.   ARTICLE II AND STATE LAW 
 Article II provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Man-
ner as the Legislature thereof may direct,” electors for President and 
Vice President.5 In Bush I, the United States Supreme Court sug-
gested that this language did not merely specify that state law would 
govern the conduct of presidential elections but in fact constituted a 
special kind of delegation of authority to the state legislature.6 In 
                                                                                                                    
 5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 6. The per curiam opinion stated: 
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Bush II, the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, explicitly adopted this position. The 
concurrence asserted that Article II “leaves it to the legislature ex-
clusively to define the method” of selecting presidential electors and 
that a “significant departure from the legislative scheme,” therefore, 
raises a federal constitutional question.7 Indeed, from the remainder 
of the opinion, it is clear that under the concurrence’s theory, a sig-
nificant departure from the legislative scheme not only raises a con-
stitutional question but actually violates the provisions of Article II. 
Accordingly, the concurrence undertook the task of determining 
whether the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida law 
distorted the intent of the legislature, thus transgressing Article II. 
 This section examines some of the bases for the theory that Article 
II confers plenary power on the state legislature. I explore in particu-
lar the justification for concluding that Article II frees the state legis-
lature from the constraints that the state constitution otherwise 
would impose. The state constitution assumes particular importance 
in the discussion because, with the exception of the United States 
Constitution, the state constitution generally serves as the sole check 
on state legislative power. The primary target of a plenary power 
reading of Article II is the state constitution. As became apparent in 
Bush II, the concurrence’s theory targets the state judiciary as well. 
 In defending its understanding of Article II, the concurrence re-
lied primarily on the text of the constitutional provision and on lan-
guage drawn from McPherson v. Blacker.8 As the dissenters pointed 
out, however, neither the word “legislature” nor the Blacker prece-
dent can bear the weight that the concurrence places on it.9 A possi-
ble source for the interpretation of Article II on which the concur-
                                                                                                                    
[I]n the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable not only to elec-
tions to state offices, but also to the selection of Presidential electors, the legis-
lature is not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the 
State, but by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, 
of the United States Constitution. 
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76. 
 7. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting McPherson v. 
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892)). 
 8. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 9. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 123-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg 
and Breyer, JJ.) (rejecting concurrence’s interpretation of Article II and Blacker); id. at 
147-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined in relevant part by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter, 
JJ.) (same); see also id. at 141-43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and 
Breyer, JJ.) (rejecting concurrence’s interpretation of Article II, without specific reference 
to Blacker); POSNER, supra note 2, at 156 (describing Article II theory as “not compelled by 
case law, legislative history, or constitutional language”). 
 With regard to the Article II issue, Justice Souter’s dissent focused on defending the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision against the charge of being unreasonable. Justice Souter 
did not confront directly the concurrence’s derivation of a special limitation on judicial in-
terpretation of state laws governing presidential elections. See id. at 129-33 (Souter, J., 
dissenting, joined in relevant part by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.). 
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rence did not rely was evidence of the Framers’ conception of the re-
lationships between state legislatures and state constitutions. The 
inferences from the founding period, however, are similarly unsup-
portive of the concurrence’s position. 
A.   Text and Context 
 The concurrence proceeded as if the constitutional language con-
tained a clear, self-evident grant of plenary authority to the legisla-
ture. The text, however, is not nearly so univocal. Contrary to the 
theory of the concurrence, the constitutional use of “legislature” cer-
tainly could refer to the lawmaking authority of the state generally. 
Under this interpretation, the constitutional language indicates that 
the determination of the method of selecting presidential electors 
shall be governed by state law, as state law is commonly made in the 
state. The constitutional language, in this view, does not endow the 
state legislature with a special role. Instead, the state legislature 
would act in this area of lawmaking as it does in all others, subject to 
the constraints of the state constitution and to the interpretive au-
thority of the state courts, insofar as the courts have jurisdiction un-
der the relevant statutory and constitutional scheme. The United 
States Supreme Court previously adopted such an interpretation of 
similar language in Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution. That pro-
vision states, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by 
the Legislature thereof . . . .”10 
 In Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant,11 the United States Supreme 
Court addressed a claim that in light of Article 1, Section 4, a state 
legislative reapportionment scheme could not be subject to a popular 
referendum. The Court found that the challenge under Article 1, 
Section 4 should be construed as raising a claim that the state refer-
endum system destroyed the legislative power, thus violating the 
guarantee of republican government contained in Article IV of the 
United States Constitution.12 As thus construed, the Court held the 
challenge to be nonjusticiable. Because the Court relied on nonjusti-
ciability rather than a direct interpretation of Article I, Section 4, 
Hildebrant may be of limited relevance. Nevertheless, a possible in-
ference is that the Court concluded that the only way in which state-
law restrictions on legislative prerogative could raise constitutional 
issues would be for the limitations actually to obliterate the exercise 
of legislative power. The Court colorfully characterized the challenge 
                                                                                                                    
 10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 11. 241 U.S. 565 (1916). 
 12. “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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to the referendum procedure as resting “upon the assumption that to 
include the referendum in the scope of the legislative power is to in-
troduce a virus which destroys that power, which in effect annihi-
lates representative government . . . .”13 Hildebrant thus could be un-
derstood to stand for the principle that, at least with respect to Arti-
cle I, Section 4, state-law restrictions on legislative power are consti-
tutionally acceptable as long as they do not infect the state with a vi-
rus that fatally undermines legislative power. 
 In a later case, Smiley v. Holm,14 the Court more directly con-
fronted the interpretation of the grant of authority to the “legisla-
ture” in Article I, Section 4. Smiley raised the question whether this 
language empowered a state legislature to establish congressional 
districts free from the usual state-law requirement of presentment to 
the Governor for signature or veto. In Smiley, the state supreme 
court had accepted an argument, similar to that endorsed by concur-
rence in Bush II, that the constitutional reference to “legislature” 
gave the state legislature special authority, different from the law-
making power that it normally exercised.15 The United States Su-
preme Court rejected this argument, holding that Article I, Section 4 
merely referred to the normal lawmaking processes of the state, in-
cluding any limitations imposed by the state constitution.16 
 Stronger, albeit inferential, support for the plenary power position 
comes from the analogy to the action of the state legislature in ratify-
ing amendments to the United States Constitution. Under Article V, 
one path to the ratification of an amendment is approval by “the Leg-
islatures of three fourths of the several States . . . .”17 In two cases in 
the 1920s, the United States Supreme Court suggested that in ratify-
ing constitutional amendments, state legislatures did operate inde-
pendently of certain provisions of state law.18 
 Hawke v. Smith19 concerned a provision of the Ohio Constitution 
that apparently made legislative ratifications of amendments to the 
United States Constitution subject to a popular referendum. In find-
ing the referendum provision inapplicable, the United States Su-
preme Court gave an expansive account of the power of the state leg-
islature. The Court asserted that in ratifying constitutional amend-
                                                                                                                    
 13. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 569. 
 14. 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
 15. Id. at 364-65. 
 16. Id. at 367-68 (“We find no suggestion in the Federal constitutional provision of an 
attempt to endow the legislature of the State with power to enact laws in any manner 
other than that in which the Constitution of the State has provided that laws shall be en-
acted.”). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 18. See generally Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Hawke v. Smith 253 U.S. 221 
(1920). 
 19. 253 U.S. 221 (1920). 
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ments, the state legislature enjoyed special authority, independent of 
its usual lawmaking competence. The Court noted the argument that 
ratification constituted an act of lawmaking subject to state-law re-
quirements. The Court rejected this position, asserting that “ratifica-
tion by a State of a constitutional amendment is not an act of legisla-
tion within the proper sense of the word.”20 The Court further em-
phasized the federal nature of the ratification authority: “It is true 
that the power to legislate in the enactment of the laws of a State is 
derived from the people of the State. But the power to ratify a pro-
posed amendment to the Federal Constitution has its source in the 
Federal Constitution.”21 
 In assessing this language, it is useful to keep in mind the ex-
traordinary circumstances in which Hawke arose. After the Ohio 
Legislature purportedly ratified the Eighteenth Amendment, estab-
lishing Prohibition, the Secretary of State of the United States 
declared the amendment valid, listing Ohio as one of the ratifying 
states.22 The Court expressed understandable concern at the prospect 
that the validity of an amendment to the United States Constitution 
could be undermined based on a state-law challenge brought after 
national recognition of the ratification.23 In the context of constitu-
tional amendments, the Court suggested, uniform procedures were 
required to avoid confusion and disarray.24 The inhospitable context 
in which the challenge arose may limit the broad applicability of the 
language in the Article V context.25 
 The other case addressing the influence of state law in limiting 
the state legislature’s ratification authority arose in a similarly un-
appealing context. Leser v. Garnett26 concerned challenges to the va-
lidity of the Nineteenth Amendment, granting suffrage to women, 
based on alleged failures to comply with state-law mandates. In re-
buffing these claims, the Court again affirmed that when exercising 
its ratification authority, the state legislature acts unrestricted by 
                                                                                                                    
 20. Id. at 229. 
 21. Id. at 230. 
 22. Id. at 225; see also Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the Peo-
ple of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional 
Amendment Process?, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037, 1076-79 (2000) (describing circum-
stances surrounding Hawke v. Smith). 
 23. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230. 
 24. See id. (“Any other view might lead to endless confusion in the manner of ratifica-
tion of federal amendments. The choice of means of ratification was wisely withheld from 
conflicting action in the several States.”). 
 25. See Amar, supra note 22, at 1079-80 (suggesting that the distinctive factual con-
text of Hawke limits its applicability as an interpretation of the scope of state-law limita-
tions over Article V processes); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Arti-
cle V: The Constitutional Lessons of The Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 
731 (1993) (discussing the role of state law in regulating the state ratification process and 
concluding that “Hawke was wrongly decided”). 
 26. 258 U.S. 130 (1922). 
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state law limitations.27 The broad language mirrored the statements 
in Hawke. As in Hawke, one can understand the reluctance of the 
Court to entertain attempts to revoke a constitutional amendment 
that had been certified by the Secretary of State of the United States. 
For present purposes, the Court’s emphasis on the federal character 
of the state legislative ratification remains most relevant: “But the 
function of a state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to 
the Federal Constitution, like the function of Congress in proposing 
the amendment, is a federal function derived from the Federal Con-
stitution; and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by 
the people of a State.”28 Also relevant is the Court’s apparent, though 
unexpressed, concern about the chaos that such after-the-fact chal-
lenges could produce. 
 The ratification of constitutional amendments differs in many 
ways from designating the manner of selecting presidential electors. 
The latter involves the articulation of election procedures in a man-
ner generally accomplished by legislative activity. Promulgating an 
election code, for whatever office, is a kind of function normally un-
dertaken by the body wielding the lawmaking authority of the state. 
Approving or disapproving a proposed amendment to the United 
States Constitution is arguably sui generis; setting election processes 
is not. In this way, regulating presidential elections seems to bear a 
much closer resemblance to regulating congressional elections than it 
does to ratifying constitutional amendments.29 
 On the other hand, setting procedures for presidential elections 
does share some attributes with the amendment process. In particu-
lar, the outcome of the process has national effects in a way that the 
election of representatives and senators from a state does not. As 
with the ratification of amendments, in a presidential election each 
state is a participant in a process with a single national outcome. As 
we are all now painfully aware, delay or confusion in the election 
process in any one state puts the rest of the nation on hold. Clarity 
and finality serve strong national interests with respect both to 
amendments and to presidential elections. The analogy is not exact, 
but similar concerns attend both processes. 
 Without much amplification, the concurrence in Bush II noted the 
strong national interest in the conduct of presidential elections. 
Rather than rely on Hawke or Leser, the concurrence quoted general 
statements from other opinions about the important federal functions 
performed by presidential electors and the national interest in presi-
                                                                                                                    
 27. See id. at 137. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 n.1 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Article I, § 
4, and Article II, § 1, both call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking capacity whereas 
Article V simply calls on the legislative body to deliberate upon a binary decision.”). 
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dential elections.30 What remains unclear, however, is how the strong 
federal interest in presidential elections generates the unusual view 
of legislative authority and judicial interpretation that the concur-
rence proceeded to employ in the case. In brief, granting that the se-
lection of presidential electors implicates significant national con-
cerns, why would eschewing reliance on state constitutions serve 
that interest? 
B.   The Blacker Precedent 
 The theory that Article II’s reference to the “Legislature” means 
something other than the usual lawmaking authority of the state 
does not ineluctably follow from the constitutional text. The main 
case on which the concurrence relied, McPherson v. Blacker,31 simi-
larly provides at best ambiguous support for the plenary power the-
ory. 
 Blacker concerned the Michigan Legislature’s division of the state 
into districts for presidential elections. By statute, the state legisla-
ture had provided that presidential electors would be elected in each 
congressional district, rather than on a statewide basis.32 The statute 
was challenged on the theory that statewide election was required by 
Article II’s command that “[e]ach State shall appoint”33 presidential 
electors. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court asserted 
that the constitutional reference to a “State” designated the law-
making authority of the state, a conclusion the Court found rein-
forced by the language “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof 
may direct . . . .”34 The Court concluded that Article II could not be 
read to limit the authority of the state legislature to allocate electors 
by district, rather than by the state as a whole.35 The Court but-
tressed its conclusion by noting the long history of states selecting 
presidential electors by districts.36 
 The opinion does contain language emphasizing the authority re-
posed in the state legislature. The opinion refers to the “plenary 
power”37 of the state legislatures in the appointment of electors. The 
concurrence emphasized Blacker’s statement that the United States 
Constitution “leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the 
                                                                                                                    
 30. See id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 
290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934), and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983)). 
 31. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 32. Id. at 24. 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Blacker, 146 U.S. at 27, 35-36. 
 36. Id. at 29-33. 
 37. Id. at 35. 
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method” of selecting presidential electors.38 As the context of this 
particular quotation,39 as well as the opinion as a whole, indicates 
though, all this language is focused on supporting the power of the 
legislature to choose various methods of selecting electors. In 
Blacker, no state-law impediment blocked the legislative choice, and 
the language of the opinion certainly does not command the conclu-
sion that state-law restrictions are rendered impermissible by Article 
II. 
 The strongest support for the proposition that the state legislature 
acts outside of the usual state-law framework appeared in a Senate 
Report quoted in the opinion.40 With regard to the power of the state 
legislature to choose presidential electors, that Report asserted, “This 
power is conferred upon the legislatures of the States by the constitu-
tion of the United States, and cannot be taken from them or modified 
by their State constitutions . . . .”41 The Senate Report recommended 
a constitutional amendment providing that a state’s electoral votes 
be determined by a direct vote of the people of each state, on a dis-
trict-by-district basis.42 The Report stressed the residual power of the 
state legislatures and thus emphasized that only a constitutional 
amendment could guarantee direct popular participation in a presi-
dential election.43 This language from a Senate Report supporting an 
unadopted constitutional amendment adds little to the basic point 
that Blacker used broad language endorsing state legislative power, 
but deployed that language in responding to quite a different ques-
tion from that posed in the Bush cases. 
 As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, Blacker also con-
tains isolated language that contradicted the concurrence’s theory.44 
In certain passages, that opinion suggested that in determining the 
                                                                                                                    
 38. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 39. The quoted language comes from the following paragraph: 
 The [United States] [C]onstitution does not provide that the appointment of 
electors shall be by popular vote, nor that the electors shall be voted for upon a 
general ticket, nor that the majority of those who exercise the elective franchise 
can alone choose the electors. It recognizes that the people act through their 
representatives in the legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to 
define the method of effecting the object. 
Blacker, 146 U.S. at 27. In this passage, the word “exclusively” appears to refer to the ab-
sence of federal constitutional limitations on the legislature’s choice, rather than the ab-
sence of any state law limitations. Indeed, the emphasis on the legislature’s representing 
the people could be quite compatible with the notion that the legislature might need to 
take cognizance of the will of the people as expressed in the state constitution. 
 40. Id. at 34-35 (citing S. REP. NO. 43-395 (1874)). 
 41. Id. at 35 (quoting S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9). 
 42. S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 2. 
 43. The Report proved quite prescient in certain regards. It expressed concern that a 
President might be elected by receiving a majority of the electoral votes while “his oppo-
nent may carry the remaining States by such majorities as to give him perhaps half a mil-
lion majority of the whole vote of the people.” Id. at 5. 
 44. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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manner of appointing presidential electors, as in other legislative ac-
tions, the state legislature must conform to the usual restrictions on 
legislative power, including any limitations imposed by the state con-
stitution.45 The dissenters also might have noted that in its lengthy 
description of the various methods by which states had chosen elec-
tors in previous presidential elections, Blacker mentioned that the 
manner of selection in Colorado actually was set by the state consti-
tution.46 None of Justice Stevens’ references definitively refute the 
concurrence’s theory of plenary legislative power under Article II. 
The references merely confirm that Blacker offers at best limited 
support for the concurrence’s thesis. 
C.   The Framers’ View of State Constitutions and State Legislatures 
 The evidence from the founding period does not appear sympa-
thetic to a conception of plenary legislative power. Rather, the Fram-
ers harbored a certain degree of distrust of state legislatures.47 The 
Framers of the United States Constitution were aware of the differ-
ent forms of government attempted under state constitutions, and 
they understood the problem of legislative overreaching that could 
occur under the then-existing state charters.48 Indeed, scholars such 
as Robert Williams have suggested that the unchecked legislative 
power embodied in such documents as the Pennsylvania Constitution 
of 1776 provided a kind of negative exemplar for those drafting the 
United States Constitution.49 Such sources imply that the Framers 
understood how state governments and state constitutions operated 
and that they had concerns about the constitutional notion of un-
                                                                                                                    
 45. Justice Stevens characterized Blacker as follows: 
Lest there be any doubt, we stated over 100 years ago in McPherson v. Blacker, 
146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892), that “[w]hat is forbidden or required to be done by a 
State” in the Article II context “is forbidden or required of the legislative power 
under state constitutions as they exist.” In the same vein, we also observed that 
“[t]he [State’s ] legislative power is the supreme authority except as limited by 
the constitution of the State.” 
Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 46. Blacker, 146 U.S. at 33. Other states also regulate presidential elections in part 
through state constitutional provisions. See OKLA. CONST. art. 3, § 3 (regulating nomina-
tion of presidential electors); PA. CONST. art. 7, § 13 (mandating judicial resolution of dis-
puted presidential elections). But see State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 279, 286-87 
(Neb. 1948) (interpreting Blacker to prohibit a state constitutional provision from circum-
scribing the legislature’s prerogative). 
 47. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 
438-53 (1969); Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Penn-
sylvania’s Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 
TEMP. L. REV. 541 (1989). 
 48. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, “Experience Must Be Our Only Guide”: The State 
Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 403, 424-27 (1988). 
 49. Id.; Williams, supra note 47, at 576, 584-85; see also WOOD, supra note 47, at 438-
53. 
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checked state legislative power. Of course, before the Reconstruction 
Amendments and the doctrine of incorporation, the state constitution 
served as the primary limitation on state legislative power and the 
primary protector of individual rights. The United States Constitu-
tion in this period offered only quite modest constraints on state leg-
islative power.50 Again, the sources are not conclusive but do not ap-
pear to lend support to the view of the concurrence. These observa-
tions from the founding are certainly consistent with the notion that 
Article II confers power on the state legislature as situated within an 
ongoing constitutional system, as opposed to the idea that Article II 
lifts the state legislature out of the usual state governmental frame-
work. 
II.   SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF STATE COURT DETERMINATIONS  
OF STATE LAW 
 The concurrence’s theory of plenary legislative authority under 
Article II, I have argued, does not rest on firm foundations of text, 
precedent, or history. The truly remarkable feature of the concur-
rence, however, lies in its assertion of a strong federal role in review-
ing state court determinations of state law.51 Warned by the United 
States Supreme Court’s remand in Bush I, the Florida Supreme 
Court disavowed reliance on the state constitution in its subsequent 
rulings. In Bush II, the concurrence clarified that in the view of the 
Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas, the plenary power 
theory served not only to disable the state constitution, but also to 
impose a federal anti-distortion rule on the state judiciary.52 
 The concurrence acknowledged that in reviewing cases arising out 
of state courts, the United States Supreme Court generally accepts 
as authoritative state court determinations of state law.53 In this in-
stance, however, the concurrence drove a federal wedge between 
                                                                                                                    
 50. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 51. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 52. Id. at 111-22. The Florida Supreme Court apparently understood the Article II is-
sue as a rather formalistic prohibition on relying on the state constitution. Accordingly, on 
remand in Bush I, the Florida Supreme Court largely reiterated its first opinion, deleting 
the references to the state constitution. See Gore v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2000). 
The Florida Supreme Court seems to have understood the situation as presenting a kind of 
harmless error calculation. A common occurrence, particularly in criminal cases, is for the 
United States Supreme Court to suggest that a state court relied on an invalid basis for a 
judgment. It is typical for the state supreme court then to undertake a harmless error 
analysis, which may well result in the court’s reissuing the same judgment. At least cer-
tain Justices on the United States Supreme Court apparently contemplated that they were 
dispensing a more thoroughgoing rebuke to the Florida Supreme Court and that its reissu-
ing the prior judgment indicated insubordination. See Oral Argument at 44, Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html; 
Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2001, at A1. 
 53. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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state law as promulgated by the legislature and state law as inter-
preted by the state courts. Article II, the concurrence asserted, con-
ferred independent significance on the former and imposed a corre-
sponding duty on the United States Supreme Court to ensure that 
the state court interpretation did not distort the legislative com-
mand.54 
A.   The Concurrence’s Standard of Review: “Independent”  
and/or “Deferential” 
 In discussing its review of the Florida Supreme Court’s judgment, 
the concurrence referred to the United States Supreme Court’s con-
stitutional duty “to undertake an independent, if still deferential, 
analysis of state law.”55 An initial problem in understanding this 
formulation is that it appears to contemplate review that is both “in-
dependent” and “deferential.” This standard has an oxymoronic qual-
ity in that independent review generally is contrasted with deferen-
tial review.56 
 In any event, the concurrence’s analysis of the opinions of the 
Florida Supreme Court could hardly be termed deferential. Having 
avowed a deferential standard, the concurrence deployed the neces-
sary adjectival barrage. The concurrence labeled the Florida Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of the Florida election scheme “ab-
surd”57 and “peculiar”58 and asserted that “[n]o reasonable person”59 
could share that court’s understanding of the law. The dissenters ob-
jected that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida law 
was reasonable.60 The arguments of the dissenters, as well as of sub-
sequent academic commentators,61 cast substantial doubt on the con-
currence’s characterization of the Florida Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of Florida law. Indeed, the concurrence appeared to engage in 
de novo review of the state court’s interpretation of the state statu-
tory scheme. Based on the answer the concurrence provided, the 
proper question was not whether the Florida Supreme Court de-
parted substantially from the legislative plan but simply whether 
that court correctly construed the statutes. Such judgments are of 
                                                                                                                    
 54. Id. at 112-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 55. Id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 56. See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991) (“[T]he difference 
between a rule of deference and the duty to exercise independent review is ‘much more 
than a mere matter of degree.’” (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 
U.S. 485, 501 (1984))). 
 57. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., id. at 151-52 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 61. See, e.g., James M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Poli-
tics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1416-25 (2001). 
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course contestable, but the concurrence’s approach did not appear 
deferential.62 For present purposes, though, the critical question is 
not whether the concurrence or the Florida Supreme Court better 
understood Florida law or even the precise standard of review that 
the concurrence adopted. Rather, the key issue is the justification for 
federal scrutiny of the state court’s interpretation of state law. Con-
sideration of other contexts in which the United States Supreme 
Court has exercised review of state-law issues helps to provide a 
framework for assessing the concurrence’s approach.  
B.   Precedents for Federal Review of State Court Determinations  
of State Law 
 In a variety of areas, the United States Supreme Court has as-
serted the authority to review state court determinations of state 
law. Though diverse in terms of subject matter and approach, these 
cases generally involve a strong federal interest in the predictable 
application of state law and a suspicion about whether the state 
courts will adequately protect the federal interest. One could charac-
terize the cases as involving a presumed federal interest in predict-
ability and a presumed comparative institutional advantage of the 
federal courts in interpreting the applicable law. Invocations of due 
process limitations on retroactivity, general common law, and federal 
common law reflect these principles.63 
                                                                                                                    
 62. Of course, “deference” may be a relative term, and the approach of the concur-
rence may have some affinities with the scope of review that the Court has adopted in 
some recent cases testing the breadth of congressional authority. See Robert A. Schapiro, 
Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 
85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 669-80 (2000). In embarking on its current course of reviewing 
congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, for example, the Court 
avowed “deference” to congressional judgments. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
536 (1997) (“It is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e] whether and what legis-
lation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and its conclu-
sions are entitled to much deference.” (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 
(1966))). Especially as elaborated in subsequent cases, however, the Court’s mode of review 
appears rather skeptical. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trs. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). To put it slightly differently, if deference is defined by Kimel 
and Garrett, the approach of the concurrence in Bush II may appear relatively more defer-
ential. Cf. id. at 386-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s more recent cases have pro-
fessed to follow the longstanding principle of deference to Congress. . . . But the Court’s 
analysis and ultimate conclusion deprive its declarations of practical significance. The 
Court ‘sounds the word of promise to the ear but breaks it to the hope.’”). 
 63. Protective jurisdiction also often reflects an interest in the uniform development 
of the law and a skepticism about the capacity of state courts to sustain this federal inter-
est. See Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 542, 566-76 (1983). 
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1.   Bouie and Fair Notice 
 The principal precedents cited by the concurrence were Bouie v. 
City of Columbia64 and NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.65 In 
these cases, the United States Supreme Court concluded that state 
courts had engaged in novel acts of interpretation that deprived indi-
viduals of valuable rights without fair notice. In Bouie, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court had adopted a new construction of a crimi-
nal trespass statute to affirm the convictions of demonstrators pro-
testing a racially segregated lunch counter.66 The NAACP case con-
cerned a contempt citation against the NAACP for refusing to di-
vulge its membership lists. The United States Supreme Court re-
fused to allow the state court=s invocation of a novel procedural rule 
to thwart federal review of the underlying constitutional issue.67 In 
both cases, the federal interest in the predictable applications of 
state law was clear and was embodied in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the civil rights context in 
which the cases arose evoked some suspicion of the state courts. In 
her dissent in Bush II, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the civil rights 
background to the cases,68 and commentators have stressed this as-
pect as well.69 As I will suggest, presidential elections do implicate 
important federal interests, but whether that federal interest re-
quires a federal standard of predictability is far from certain. 
2.   General Common Law 
 In some measure, the concurrence’s review of state court determi-
nations of state law hearkens back to United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in the pre-Erie era. During this period the federal 
courts generally deferred to state court constructions of state stat-
utes and state constitutions, even while they disavowed reliance on 
state court precedent in matters of general common law. However, 
federal courts sometimes did engage in independent interpretation of 
state statutes and constitutions.70 In Township of Pine Grove v. Tal-
                                                                                                                    
 64. 378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
 65. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 66. 378 U.S. at 348, 355-56. 
 67. 357 U.S. at 454-58. 
 68. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 139-41 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 69. See Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie Be Buoyed?: Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking 
and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 35, 54-56 (1997); see also id. at 
55 n.82 (citing sources). Professor Krent has suggested that while Bouie has been applied 
outside of the civil rights context, its application often has been associated with “limiting 
judicial vindictiveness.” Id. at 74. 
 70. See Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Develop-
ment of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1281-82 (2000); James A. Gard-
ner, The Positivist Revolution That Wasn’t: Constitutional Universalism in the States, 4 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 109, 117-22 (1998). 
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cott,71 for example, the United States Supreme Court confronted the 
question whether a state statute violated the state constitution. The 
Michigan Supreme Court had adjudicated this question on two occa-
sions.72 The United States Supreme Court, though, refused to follow 
those opinions.73 The Court reviewed and rejected the state court’s 
interpretation of the Michigan Constitution.74 The United States Su-
preme Court stated: “With all respect for the eminent tribunal by 
which the judgments were pronounced, we must be permitted to say 
that they are not satisfactory to our minds. We think the dissenting 
opinion in the one first decided is unanswered.”75 In this period, the 
United States Supreme Court appeared especially willing to reject 
state court interpretations that departed from prior state decisional 
authority so as to frustrate commercial expectations. For example, in 
suits by bondholders, the Court did not feel bound to follow novel 
state court rulings that the bonds were issued without proper legal 
authority and were therefore uncollectible.76 The Court’s decisions re-
flected a strong federal interest in a uniform, predictable law govern-
ing commercial activity. Further, the Court’s decisions evinced a 
skepticism about the fairness of state court decisions, particularly as 
they related to the rights of out-of-state creditors. Such skepticism 
may have been warranted.77 As the Court memorably summed up its 
attitude toward state court interpretations of state law, “We shall 
never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal 
has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice.”78 Even in this period, 
the United States Supreme Court exercised interpretive autonomy 
only if an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity, 
existed. The Court did not view such flawed state court rulings as 
creating a federal question permitting direct review by the United 
States Supreme Court.79 Rather, it was the constitutional and statu-
tory grants of diversity jurisdiction that provided a legal basis for 
skepticism about state court interpretation of state law. 
3.   A Federal Common Law of Election Procedure 
 Perhaps the better framework for understanding Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s approach is federal common law, the modern successor 
that arose out of the ashes of general common law. In effect, the con-
currence treated the Florida code governing presidential elections as 
                                                                                                                    
 71. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666 (1874). 
 72. Id. at 677. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Collins, supra note 70, at 1269-72. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206-07 (1863). 
 79. See Collins, supra note 70, at 1271-72. 
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a species of federal law, subject to plenary review in the United 
States Supreme Court. The relevant precedent was not the line of 
cases including Murdock v. City of Memphis80 and Michigan v. 
Long,81 establishing that the United States Supreme Court would 
generally not review state court resolutions of state law issues. Nor, 
despite the claims of the concurrence, did the opinion draw its sup-
port from Bouie and its progeny, establishing that in narrow circum-
stances novel state court interpretations of state law would impose 
unconstitutional burdens on litigants without fair notice. The man-
ner of interpretation undertaken by the concurrence suggested that 
the controlling authority was Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,82 which af-
firmed the Supreme Court’s authority to review state court interpre-
tations of federal law. 
 As the concurrence did not fully explain its independent standard 
of review, it did not address the implicit transmutation of state law 
into federal law. In light of the concurrence’s emphasis on the impor-
tant federal interests involved, it appears that the concurrence es-
sentially decided that Article II authorized a federal common law 
governing presidential election procedures. In accord with Article II’s 
command, the state legislature determined the content of the election 
code, but the interpretation of the code presented a federal question. 
As with the other areas discussed, the creation of federal common 
law is generally justified by the strength of the federal interest and 
the need for predictability and uniformity.83 Skepticism of allowing 
the conduct to be regulated wholly by state law as defined by state 
courts also characterizes federal common law.84 
III.   THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN STATE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
PROCEDURES 
 So far, I have argued that both the concurrence’s conception of leg-
islative power under Article II and its approach to reviewing the 
                                                                                                                    
 80. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
 81. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 82. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 83. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 881, 982-83 (1986); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal 
Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1170 (1986); see also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 
440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979). 
 84. Thus, when federal common law incorporates state law, courts generally recognize 
a reserved federal right to disregard state law that would disserve the particular federal 
interest at issue. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) 
(“This federal reference to state law will not obtain, of course, in situations in which the 
state law is incompatible with federal interests.”); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 
581 (1956) (in context of Copyright Act, concluding that “[t]his does not mean that a State 
would be entitled to use the word ‘children’ in a way entirely strange to those familiar with 
its ordinary usage, but at least to the extent that there are permissible variations in the 
ordinary concept of ‘children’ we deem state law controlling.”). 
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Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law depended on un-
articulated notions of federal policy. Part I contended that the con-
currence’s theory of plenary legislative power under Article II lacked 
support in text, precedent, or history. The strongest basis for the con-
currence’s understanding of legislative authority was the nature of 
the federal interest in presidential elections. Part II argued that the 
concurrence’s scrutiny of the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of state law is best explained as an attempt to fashion a federal 
common law of presidential election procedures. However, whether 
understood as federal common law, general common law, or the ap-
plication of Bouie, the justification for the concurrence’s scrutiny of 
state law requires an articulation of the nature of the federal interest 
in the conduct of presidential elections in each state.85 The concur-
rence did little to explicate the nature of the federal interests that it 
understood to ground its disposition of Bush II. This Part explores 
the potential federal interests at stake, including protecting state 
legislatures from judicial overreaching, ensuring uniformity in presi-
dential election procedures, and imposing preferred modes of statu-
tory construction. I argue that a proper understanding of state con-
stitutions and the relationship between state courts and state legis-
latures demonstrates that no federal interests justify the kind of in-
trusive federal intervention advocated by the concurrence. Moreover, 
the complexity of each state’s constitutional dynamic belies the con-
currence’s attempt to mandate uniform rules for the interpretation of 
state election statutes. 
A.   Federal Protection of State Legislatures 
 In its rejection of a role for state constitutions in setting presiden-
tial election procedures, as well as in its formulation of an anti-
distortion rule, the concurrence expressed a need to protect state leg-
islatures from activist state courts. The concurrence assumed that 
the will of the legislature would be thwarted by the limitations of the 
state constitution and by the interference of the state courts. Rather 
than conceiving of the state legislature as one part of functioning 
state constitutional system, the concurrence insisted on extracting 
the state legislature from its constitutional setting. The concurrence 
refused to understand the state legislature as integrally connected to 
a complex governmental structure that included a state constitution 
and state courts. The concurrence contended that constitutional text 
and precedent erected a judicially enforceable federal shield around 
                                                                                                                    
 85. This Part focuses on the federal interests that might underlie the creation of fed-
eral common law. A similar analysis would apply to the invocation of Bouie or general 
common law. Federal court review of state law in those areas, as well, rests on federal in-
terests in the uniform application of law and assumptions about the relative competence of 
federal and state courts. 
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the state legislature. As discussed above, these claims are unconvinc-
ing. Moreover, the concurrence’s more general assertion of the need 
to protect the state legislature manifested a lack of appreciation of 
the functioning of state political systems. A more complete account of 
the relationship among state courts, state constitutions, and state 
legislatures indicates the absence of any need for federal interven-
tion. Contrary to the view of the concurrence, the relationship among 
state courts, state legislatures, and state constitutions can be con-
ceived of as cooperative, rather than adversarial. 
1.   State Constitutions and State Legislatures 
 The concurrence did not devote much attention to supporting the 
proposition that Article II’s reference to the legislature disabled the 
state constitution. The concurrence appeared to assume a strong sepa-
ration between the state legislature and the state constitution, and be-
tween state statutes and state constitutional law. Perhaps the concur-
rence, or the Court generally, understood the structure of the national 
government in such dichotomous terms, but state constitutional sys-
tems generally have much less dualist tendencies. State constitutions 
function more like statutes than does the Federal Constitution, and 
the state legislature has a much greater role in the amendment and 
interpretation of the constitution than Congress normally enjoys. 
 Other features of state constitutions support the principle that 
state legislatures are well integrated into state constitutional law 
processes. State constitutions function in a variety of ways. They al-
locate governmental authority. They place limits, both negative and 
positive,86 on state governmental activity. They state broad principles 
of democratic governance. They regulate apparently trivial aspects of 
state law.87 State legislatures play an active role in the their promul-
gation and (frequent) amendment.88 The length, specificity, and easy 
amendability of state constitutions helps to highlight the substantial 
degree of integration between state constitutions and other forms of 
state law. In Florida, for example, it is the state constitution that 
                                                                                                                    
 86. For a discussion of state constitutions as affording positive rights, mandating gov-
ernmental action, see Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of 
Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 
RUTGERS L.J. 1057 (1993); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The 
Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999); Helen Hershkoff, 
Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1403 (1999); Schapiro, 
supra note 62, at 709-10. 
 87. For some classic examples, see N.Y. CONST. art. 14, § 1 (regulating width of ski 
slopes), and TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 16 (providing for banks’ use of “unmanned teller ma-
chines”); see also James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 761, 818-19 (1992) (collecting examples of state constitutional provisions). 
 88. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 23-27 (1998); see also 
Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 
389, 428-30 & n.148 (1998) (citing sources). 
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provides a comprehensive plan for judicial organization and jurisdic-
tion.89 The interconnected nature of the statutory and constitutional 
systems appears as well in the separation of powers principle embod-
ied in the Florida Code, which makes explicit reference to the state 
constitution: 
 The State Constitution contemplates the separation of powers 
within state government among the legislative, executive, and ju-
dicial branches of the government. . . . The judicial branch has the 
purpose of determining the constitutional propriety of the policies 
and programs and of adjudicating any conflicts arising from the in-
terpretation or application of the laws.90 
Other statutory provisions purport to define the meaning of terms 
contained in the constitution, and state courts often defer to these 
legislative judgments.91 
2.   State Courts and State Legislatures 
 Indeed, another key feature that distinguishes state constitution-
alism from federal constitutionalism is the greater deference to the 
legislature that state courts generally manifest. Perhaps because 
their handiwork is more easily revised or because they are often sub-
ject to direct electoral review, state court judges generally avow a 
very deferential standard of review in assessing the constitutionality 
of legislative judgments.92 This high standard of invalidity corre-
sponds to a background notion of one sense of plenary legislative 
power. Under state constitutional schemes, state legislatures are 
generally presumed to exercise all powers, unless the constitution 
imposes limitations. Unlike the national legislature, the state legis-
lature is not limited to enumerated powers. This plenary power the-
ory may incline state courts to adopt a lesser role in constitutional 
review.93 
 If citizens or legislators believe that state courts are invoking 
their power unwisely, various remedies are available. States have 
shown a fair amount of creativity in limiting the exercise of judicial 
review under the state constitution. The constitutions of Nebraska 
                                                                                                                    
 89. See FLA. CONST. art. V. 
 90. FLA. STAT. § 20.02(1) (2000). 
 91. See, e.g., Greater Loretta Improvement Ass’n v. Boone, 234 So. 2d 665, 670 (Fla. 
1970) (“In Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc. (Fla. 1968), 208 So. 2d 821, this Court sustained a 
statute defining the word ‘charitable’ as used in the Florida Constitution even though such 
definition conflicted with earlier decisions by this Court.”); see also ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 642-47 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing legis-
lative interpretation of the state constitution); Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional 
Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 200-01 (1983) (same). 
 92. Schapiro, supra note 62, at 690-95. 
 93. See id. at 693-95 (discussing connection between plenary power of state legisla-
ture and deferential standard of judicial review). 
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and North Dakota, for example, require a supermajority vote of their 
state supreme courts to declare a law unconstitutional.94 My point is 
not that state courts never manifest activist tendencies; rather, the 
point is that state political systems have evolved mechanisms for ad-
dressing the appropriate interaction of the state legislature and state 
courts. In accordance with varying legal regimes, the relationship be-
tween state legislatures and state courts varies among states and 
does not conform to the federal model. 
 Through the mediating force of the state judiciary, state legisla-
tures tend to have a close and interactive relationship with state con-
stitutions. Not only does the position of the state legislature differ 
from that of Congress, but state legislatures may occupy different 
roles in each state. Different amendment procedures, among other 
features of state constitutions, produce different constitutional con-
texts in each state. I do not mean to take this argument of contextual 
constitutionalism too far. Federal constitutional requirements95 and a 
relatively common political culture may ensure that state constitu-
tional systems do not diverge radically. Yet within the bounds of cul-
tural and legal constraints, diversity may be quite significant. Again, 
while not conclusive for interpreting Article II, the diversity of legis-
lative roles in state constitutional systems suggests the conceptual 
difficulty in attempting to detach the legislatures from their state 
constitutional moorings. 
B.   Diversity in State Presidential Election Procedures 
 A need for uniformity generally serves as an important prerequi-
site for the creation of federal common law.96 The concurrence, how-
ever, provided no convincing account of the need for uniformity in 
state presidential election procedures. Undoubtedly, the process of 
choosing presidential electors implicates important federal interests. 
The federal interests, however, do not justify the concurrence’s feder-
alization of the interpretation of state election codes. As with the is-
sue of protecting state legislatures, an understanding of the state po-
                                                                                                                    
 94. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (requiring concurrence of four 
justices to hold legislation unconstitutional); id. art. VI, § 2 (setting membership of su-
preme court at five justices). For examples of applications of these provisions, see Spire v. 
Beermann, 455 N.W.2d 749 (Neb. 1990) (upholding legislation despite four of seven jus-
tices finding it unconstitutional); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 
(N.D. 1994) (upholding state’s school finance system despite vote of three of five justices 
that system violates state constitution). The Ohio Constitution previously contained a su-
permajority requirement, but this provision was repealed in 1944. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2 
editor’s comment (West 1999). For further discussion of these supermajority requirements, 
see Schapiro, supra note 62, at 691 n.220 (citing sources). 
 95. For a discussion of the federal constitutional constraints on the allocation of state 
governmental authority, see Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State 
Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51 (1998). 
 96. See Field, supra note 83, at 953; Meltzer, supra note 83, at 1170-71. 
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litical system suggests the theoretical and practical problems with 
attempting to mandate uniform principles of interpretation in the 
election context. 
 The Article V precedents, Hawke v. Smith97 and Leser v. Garnett,98 
provide some support for applying federal common law to state elec-
tion procedures.99 As in the case of constitutional amendments, sub-
stantial federal interests turn on the outcome of a state’s selection of 
presidential electors. Confusion and delay could be extremely detri-
mental to national concerns. However, the strength of the federal in-
terest in predictability and uniformity is questionable. Certainly, the 
integrity of the election process is critical, but the concern of frustrat-
ing legitimate expectations appears absent. It is not clear that any-
one relied on any particular interpretation of the election code; nor is 
it certain that this area is one in which a uniform baseline exists to 
help ensure predictability. Election codes and their interpretation do 
vary widely and unavoidably from state to state. State courts would 
seem to be in the best position to interpret the particular election 
codes in their states. 
 The Court’s attempt to impose centralized control over the inter-
pretation of states’ presidential election codes thus appears mis-
guided. Congress adopted a particular set of procedures, which con-
templated states’ employing various methods in resolving contested 
elections.100 Thus, neither Article II nor its congressional implemen-
tation suggests a need for interstate uniformity, much less a uni-
formity imposed by the United States Supreme Court. The congres-
sionally established procedures entailed electoral determinations in 
each state with Congress resolving any lingering disputes.101 By exer-
cising independent review of state court determinations, effectively 
federalizing state election codes, the United States Supreme Court 
would be offering assistance that Congress did not seek.102 Nor did 
the election cases present a scenario, like Hawke or Leser, in which 
state court action threatened to undermine the finality of a national 
decision. The electors had not voted, nor had Congress received their 
votes. 
                                                                                                                    
 97. 253 U.S. 221 (1920). 
 98. 258 U.S. 130 (1922). 
 99. Cf. Paulsen, supra note 25, at 743 n.224 (arguing that the effect of a state’s appli-
cation to Congress for a constitutional convention should be governed by federal law). 
 100. See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
 101. 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-18 (1994). 
 102. Perhaps the concurrence’s view could rest on a notion that in the course of resolv-
ing election disputes, Congress may have to analyze the state election codes. By offering its 
own interpretation of the election codes, the United States Supreme Court would thereby 
be assisting Congress, utilizing its greater institutional competence in interpreting law. 
Again, given the statutory scheme, the Court would be affording “unsought” and appar-
ently undesired assistance. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam) (charac-
terizing Court as discharging “unsought responsibility”). 
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 What does tie the concurrence to the Bouie line of cases, general 
common law, and federal common law is a skepticism about the abil-
ity of state courts to protect the federal interest. Whether character-
ized as an interest in protecting state legislatures, who are acting as 
federal agents, or as an interest in predictable resolution of election 
controversies, the concurrence clearly believed that reliance on state 
courts would jeopardize that interest. From the tenor of the opinion 
and overall flow of the proceedings, the concurrence seemed to view 
the activities of the Florida Supreme Court as proof that state courts 
cannot be trusted in this area.103 Other than disagreement with the 
Florida Supreme Court’s opinions in this case, however, the concur-
rence provided no explanation of why state courts are particularly 
untrustworthy in interpreting presidential election codes. Moreover, 
skepticism about state courts, in the absence of any special need for 
uniformity, provides a very weak justification for federalizing the in-
terpretation of state law. 
C.   Legislative Intent and the State Constitution 
 Even if the concurrence were justified in federalizing the interpre-
tation of state election laws, a serious question would remain about 
the particular interpretive methodology employed. Assuming that 
federal interests in uniformity did demand that the interpretation of 
state election codes be freed from the usual state law constraints, the 
concurrence still would have to justify adopting a particular manner 
of statutory construction different from that employed by the state 
court. All parties agreed that even if the state legislature possessed 
plenary authority, it could delegate that power.104 In this instance, 
the legislature had set up a statutory scheme for resolving election 
contests that contemplated judicial involvement. The key question 
with regard to the state constitution, then, was not the abstract mat-
ter of whether the state legislature could have acted without regard 
for constitutional constraints. The practical issue was whether the 
state legislature intended to free itself of any constitutional limita-
tions. The concurrence raised the intent of the legislature to supreme 
importance, but the question remained how that intent should be 
understood with regard to the state constitution. Here, again, the 
                                                                                                                    
 103. In this regard, the best explanation for the concurrence’s position is that applied 
by Justice Stevens to the majority’s decision to intervene in the recount. See Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (in context of recount procedures, noting the ma-
jority’s endorsement of the petitioners’ “lack of confidence in the impartiality and capacity” 
of the state judiciary). 
 104. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 28-31, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-
949), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html/ (addressing scope of legis-
lature’s grant of authority to the Florida courts); Brief for Respondent Albert Gore, Jr. at 
13-14, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), available at http://www.                   
supremecourtus.gov/florida.html/ (same). 
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concurrence’s vision of state constitutionalism asserted itself and led 
the concurrence to reject the notion that the legislature desired to re-
sort to constitutional principles. 
 A significant portion of the oral argument in Bush I revolved 
around whether the references to the Florida Constitution in the 
state court’s opinion reflected a necessary reliance on that charter, or 
merely an invocation of an additional, aspirational set of values.105 
The Justices mooted whether the state constitution had become a 
substitute for the legislative text or whether it functioned like Black-
stone, simply providing a nonbinding statement of principles.106 
 Justice Scalia, most notably, pressed the notion that the Florida 
Supreme Court had used the state constitution to trump the legisla-
ture. Certainly, Justice Scalia asserted, the legislature could not 
have welcomed the court’s use of the state constitution. In a series of 
challenges to Laurence Tribe, who represented Vice President Gore, 
Justice Scalia probed this point: 
 Question: Professor Tribe, can I ask you why you think the Flor-
ida legislature delegated to the Florida Supreme Court the author-
ity to interpose the Florida Constitution? I mean, I—maybe your 
experience with the legislative branch is different from mine, but 
in my experience they are resigned to the intervention of the 
courts, but have certainly never invited it . . . . 
 Question: They are resigned, that they are resigned to, but they 
need not be resigned to the Florida Supreme Court interposing it-
self with respect to Federal elections, they need not be because the 
Florida Constitution cannot affect it. And I—I just find it implau-
sible that they really invited the Florida Supreme Court to inter-
pose the Florida Constitution between what they enacted by stat-
ute and the ultimate result of the election.107 
It is hazardous to ascribe views to Justices based on their questions. 
However, Justice Scalia certainly suggested that the state constitu-
tion would operate only as an unwanted intruder in the interpretive 
process. 
 Justice Scalia appeared ready to accept the notion that the state 
constitution might present general aspirational principles, but he 
firmly denied the notion that the state legislature would want to bind 
itself to the state constitution, as interpreted by the state court. 
Based on the general features of state constitutions discussed above, 
I would like to explore two responses to this view. First, it is not clear 
why a state legislature would necessarily wish to exclude state con-
stitutional limitations from the consideration of the judiciary. Sec-
                                                                                                                    
 105. See Oral Argument at 56-61, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 
U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 66-67. 
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ond, it is not clear that a uniform characterization of state constitu-
tions is possible. State constitutions vary a great deal. Without a 
comprehensive assessment of a particular state’s constitutional sys-
tem, an appreciation of the relationship among the constitution, the 
legislature, and the courts will remain elusive. 
1.   Determining Legislative Intent 
 On two levels, a court’s attention to the state constitution may 
promote, rather than deform, the statutory scheme. First, the state 
constitution may announce general principles that inform legislative, 
as well as judicial, decisions. Second, when the legislature enlists ju-
dicial aid in resolving election disputes, it is a fair inference that the 
legislature expects the court to decide cases in the way in which the 
court generally decides cases. 
 The state constitution may contain an accurate rendition of the 
goals and fears of the state legislature. In this way, the state consti-
tution may function as a well-publicized, formally adopted legislative 
finding. Of particular use in close or ambiguous cases, the state con-
stitution may reveal the general purposes of the legislative enact-
ment. The Florida Supreme Court’s invocation of the state constitu-
tion in its opinion in Bush I was consistent with this view of the state 
constitution as an interpretive guide, rather than a self-aggrandizing 
judicial sword. That opinion certainly allowed the view of the consti-
tution as a guide to, rather than a substitute for, statutory meaning. 
 At several points, the Florida Supreme Court emphasized that the 
Florida Constitution establishes the right of suffrage. The court 
stressed that the very first words of the Florida Constitution declare 
that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people,”108 and the court 
characterized the right of suffrage as “preeminent.”109 For the most 
part, the court appeared to use the fundamentality of the right to 
vote as an aid to statutory construction, as a means of making sense 
of a conflicting statutory regime. The court did imply that facilitating 
the right to vote was not only the presumed intent of the legislature 
but also a mandate limiting the discretion of the legislature: “To the 
extent that the Legislature may enact laws regulating the electoral 
process, those laws are valid only if they impose no ‘unreasonable or 
unnecessary’ restraints on the right of suffrage . . . .”110 The court, 
however, followed this assertion with a resort to a rule of construc-
tion, stating that “[b]ecause election laws are intended to facilitate 
                                                                                                                    
 108. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1236 (Fla. 2000) 
(quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1) (internal quotation marks omitted), vacated sub nom. 
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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the right of suffrage, such laws must be liberally construed in favor 
of the citizens’ right to vote . . . .”111 The court also suggested that the 
interpretive principles flowing from the state constitutional right to 
vote pointed away from a strict textual approach. The court warned 
that “[t]echnical statutory requirements must not be exalted over the 
substance”112 of the right to vote and disavowed a “hyper-technical re-
liance upon statutory provisions . . . .”113 
 Do these passages mean that the court was substituting the con-
stitutional right for the statutory text or, alternatively, that the court 
had given proper effect to legislative intent through appropriately in-
tentionalist interpretation? Particularly because of the close inter-
connection of statutory and constitutional law, such questions have 
no clear answers. Would the legislature have wanted the court to en-
force the letter of the statute if it conflicted with more basic democ-
ratic principles? Did the legislature believe that the letter of the law 
properly embodied its democratic commitments? 
 One response to these interpretive ambiguities would be a strict 
reliance on the text of the election code. A committed textualist 
might argue that the language of the statute should be taken as con-
clusive evidence of the goal of the legislative scheme. Any reliance on 
the state constitution to vary the text would thus be illegitimate. The 
concurrence did stress the significance of the statutory text. The con-
currence asserted that because of Article II’s direct conferral of au-
thority on the state legislature, “the text of the election law itself, 
and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on 
independent significance.”114 Perhaps in this view, the state courts 
must adopt a textualist approach to statutory interpretation.115 The 
United States Supreme Court would then defer to the state court as 
to which of competing textualist arguments deserved credence. The 
United States Supreme Court, though, would not be bound to defer to 
nontextual conclusions of the state courts. Such a preference for tex-
tualism would coincide with the concurrence’s skepticism of the state 
judiciary, for one of the justifications for a textual approach lies in its 
purported ability to restrain unprincipled judicial activism.116 
 If the supposed plenary authority of the legislature were to yield 
some preferred method of statutory construction, however, it is not 
clear that textualism would be the leading candidate. After all, tex-
                                                                                                                    
 111. Id. at 1237. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1227. 
 114. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 115. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 63 (4th ed. Supp. 2001) (noting possibility that concurrence 
suggests an Article II directive to employ textualism). 
 116. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 229 (2000). 
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tualism often is contrasted with other methods of interpretation that 
attempt more directly to ascertain the intent of the legislature.117 
Application of a textualist approach might entail contravening the 
intent of the enacting body in a specific instance.118 Textualism draws 
support instead from rule-of-law and separation of powers princi-
ples.119 Indeed, textualism sometimes functions as part of a strategy 
to discipline the legislature to induce it to act more responsibly.120 
Whatever the merits of a judge’s exercising disciplinary control over 
the legislature, such a judicial role stands in substantial tension with 
a hypothesis of plenary legislative power.121 
 In addition, the explicit delegation of authority to the courts sug-
gests the expectation that the customary judicial armamentorium 
will be employed, including reliance on a variety of interpretive 
methods and on all usual sources, including the state constitution. 
Such an inference seems at least as compelling as the contrary, that 
the legislature intended the judiciary to ignore the usual sources of 
law. That this contrary view would lead to divergent interpretations 
of the election code in different settings presents an additional rea-
son to doubt such a legislative intent. The Florida Legislature en-
acted one set of laws that generally apply to presidential and 
nonpresidential elections. The concurrence’s theory, however, would 
bifurcate the interpretation of the election laws between presidential 
elections and all other elections, which do not implicate Article II. 
One might doubt that the Florida Legislature intended such a result. 
                                                                                                                    
 117. See id. at 211, 213-36 (contrasting interpretive approaches based on legislative in-
tent and on textual meaning); Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1085, 1091 (1995) (“In contrast to textualism, intentionalism contends that the interpreter 
should be the faithful agent of the intentions of the enacting legislature.”). 
 118. In response to Justice Scalia’s questions, Professor Tribe suggested a possible 
divergence between the language of the statute and the intent of the legislature: 
 Well, I suppose if [the state legislators] were at all far-sighted, if they looked 
at their own work and saw how self-contradictory it was, they might say we 
would want someone with the authority to reconcile these provisions to do so in 
the light not only of the literal language but of the fact that they are dealing 
with something very important, the franchise, that disenfranchising people, 
which is what this is all about, disenfranchising people isn’t very nice. 
Oral Argument at 67-68, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) 
(No. 00-836), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html. 
 119. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 116, at 229. 
 120. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in 
Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 636-46 (1995) (discussing textualism as a 
“disciplinarian” approach to statutory construction). 
 121. One might note further that textualists often exhibit a skepticism about the legis-
lative process and legislative judgments. See id. at 645; Bernard W. Bell, R-E-S-P-E-C-T: 
Respecting Legislative Judgments in Interpretive Theory, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1264 (2000) 
(“[N]ew textualism embodies a skepticism of legislative judgments . . . .”). Though such 
views are not logically inconsistent with a conclusion that Article II vests plenary power in 
the state legislature, such skepticism about the political process might make one less in-
clined to infer plenary authority in the absence of a clear constitutional mandate. 
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2.   Contingency and Context 
 The proper interpretive approach depends in part on the relation-
ship among the constitution, the courts, and the legislature, and a 
variety of views of this relationship appear at least plausible. A more 
robust account would require an analysis of the constitutional struc-
ture, constitutional history, and constitutional culture of a particular 
state. The answer to the question of the proper interpretive method 
does not lie in a hypothesized common law of constitutions but in the 
thick background of each state’s constitution. Such questions of state 
constitutional theory are contingent and contextual. They cannot be 
resolved in the abstract. In this regard, one might question Justice 
Scalia’s proffer of his experience with “the legislative branch.”122 His 
universalizing observations, perceptive though they may be, shed lit-
tle light on the constitutional context in which the country’s fifty leg-
islative branches function.123 More generally, a recognition of this va-
riety and contingency casts doubt on the wisdom of assigning the in-
terpretive task to the United States Supreme Court. Unlike the state 
supreme courts, the United States Supreme Court has little experi-
ence or expertise with such potentially intricate questions of state 
law. It is important to note that what renders the question so intri-
cate is the concurrence’s hypothesis of plenary legislative power. To 
what extent the legislature would have wanted the court to take ac-
count of the state constitution, given the hypothesis of a nonbinding 
constitution, is quite a complex inquiry. A generalized view of state 
constitutions will do little to resolve this issue, and indeed the hypo-
thetical and abstract quality of the query constitutes an argument 
against the theory that would produce it. 
IV.   IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 Having argued that the concurrence’s flawed conception of state con-
stitutional systems undermined its interpretation of Article II, I now 
turn to some of the broader ramifications of the concurrence’s views. 
Cases concerning presidential elections do not arise very frequently, but 
the theory of state constitutions embodied in the concurrence could have 
more widespread implications. Federal courts face state constitutional 
issues in a variety of contexts. The interpretation of the state constitu-
tion, itself, may raise a federal claim, or a federal court might have sup-
plemental jurisdiction over a state constitutional claim. The conception 
                                                                                                                    
 122. Oral Argument at 66, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 
(2000) (No. 00-836), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/florida.html. 
 123. For a related argument that state separation of powers principles should be de-
veloped in light of the varying contexts of the various state systems, see Robert A. 
Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 99-108 (1998). 
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of state constitutionalism implicit in the Bush II concurrence suggests 
interpretive principles that would apply in these areas. 
 The concurrence adopted a uniform view of state constitutions. The 
concurrence showed no interest in examining specific state constitu-
tions or constitutional systems. The concurrence seemed to assume 
that all state constitutional systems function in a roughly similar 
manner. The concurrence also evidenced a distrust of state judges. 
 This combination of a skepticism about the state judiciary and a 
homogenous view of state constitutions does not bode well for the New 
Judicial Federalism. This development involves state courts interpret-
ing their constitutions independently of the Federal Constitution, of-
ten with the effect of extending constitutional protections beyond those 
mandated by the federal charter.124 Under the conception of the Bush 
II concurrence, state constitutional decisions deviating from the fed-
eral norm might elicit suspicion. The assumption of general uniformity 
of constitutional systems might raise a concern that a court’s decision 
to depart from the federal standard reflects unprincipled activism, and 
the Court’s apparent skepticism about the state judiciary also might 
trigger a more searching review of state constitutional decisions. 
 As far as the concurrence is concerned, the villain of the piece is 
the Florida Supreme Court, representing judicial activism. Justice 
Scalia’s questioning implied that the very reliance on the state con-
stitution signaled a kind of activism and that the business of state 
constitutions is to distort the will of the legislature. Such views 
might influence the Justices to cast a sympathetic eye on the argu-
ment that the state court interpretation of the state constitution ac-
tually violated federal law. 
 Similarly, the assumptions underlying the concurrence imply that 
the federal courts might take a narrow view of state constitutional 
interpretation that arises in the context of supplemental jurisdiction. 
The concurrence’s approach suggests that a federal court would be 
reluctant to credit a claim that the state constitution protects rights 
in addition to those enshrined in the Federal Constitution. Inclined 
to impose a uniform vision on state constitutions, the concurrence’s 
view raises the possibility that any federal baseline that did exist 
would be treated as a presumptive norm. Within this framework, 
chastened by the view of state judges as activists, the federal courts 
would be less likely to acknowledge additional protections conferred 
by the state charter. In certain areas, federal courts currently play 
                                                                                                                    
 124. For an overview of the New Judicial Federalism, see G. Alan Tarr, The New Judi-
cial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1112-13 (1997) (discussing 
growth of “new judicial federalism”); see also Jennifer Friesen, Adventures in Federalism: 
Some Observations on the Overlapping Spheres of State and Federal Constitutional Law, 3 
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 25 (1993) (same). 
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an active role in the development of state constitutional law, particu-
larly in the context of cases raising constitutional claims under both 
the state and federal constitutions.125 Under the concurrence’s ap-
proach, federal courts might be less willing to engage in this kind of 
distinctive state constitutional interpretation. At least in supplemen-
tal jurisdiction cases, the federal floor may turn into a ceiling. Rela-
tively novel claims in particular might suffer under this analysis. 
 A proper role in the interpretation of state constitutions would re-
quire federal courts to attend to the particular constitutional circum-
stances in each state. Federal courts are certainly able to perform 
such tasks. My point has been that the concurrence showed no will-
ingness to undertake such an interpretive exercise in Bush II. The 
different institutional circumstances of the federal courts might 
make them valuable partners in providing a different perspective on 
state constitutional issues. In the supplemental jurisdiction context, 
however, unlike in the presidential election cases, the federal courts 
would remain bound by authoritative state court determinations of 
state law. Federal courts could participate in the interpretive proc-
ess, but they would not have the last word. 
 Certainly, even if the concurrence in Bush II had garnered majority 
support, it would not provide an authoritative guide for a particular 
reading of state constitutions in other contexts. Nevertheless, the con-
currence evidenced a particular attitude to state constitutions and 
state courts that may apply more generally. Further, the presidential 
election cases may help to shape the approach of those Justices who 
had not devoted much attention to state constitutions and their role in 
state legal systems. For the five Justices who joined the majority opin-
ion in Bush II, the image of state constitutions and state courts may be 
tarred by the Justices’ perceptions of the impropriety of the Florida 
Supreme Court’s actions. When state constitutional issues present 
themselves, these Justices might be more inclined to “rein in” activist 
interpretations that deviate from the standards in other states and 
from the federal standard. Such an attitude to state constitutionalism 
would be an unfortunate reaction to the presidential election dispute, 
and it would, as I have suggested, ignore important features of state 
constitutionalism. In this regard, one might hope that the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of state constitutions in the Bush cases was anoma-
lous. In this area, it would be desirable if the Court followed the pro-
viso that it attached to its equal protection ruling: “Our consideration 
is limited to the present circumstances . . . .”126 
                                                                                                                    
 125. For a discussion of the role that federal courts currently play in the interpretation 
of state constitutions, see Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions 
in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409 (1999). 
 126. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam). 
